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Abstract
Fuel tank system ignition source failure threatens the safety of the aircraft. For different possible ignition sources in 
and around the fuel tank system and their airworthiness requirements, this paper proposes a particular method using 
both Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to analyze the ignition source fail-
safe features, which can minimize the hazards caused by the ignition sources failure and improve the safety of the 
whole aircraft. At last, an example is given, which proves the efficiency of the method.
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1. Introduction
The fuel tank system ignition source failure is one of typical particular risks threatening aircraft. There
are multiple accidents that due to the failure of ignition source in aviation history, even makes a 
catastrophic accident (such as TWA800 aircraft).Hence, building up a method that may assess the safety 
of ignition source failure in the plane design stage is very instructive and meaningful to the design and 
research personnel and will minimize the hazard from the accidents.
The Advisory Circular 25.981-1C[1] “Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention Guidelines” of Federal
Aviation Administration provides the parts and components that would be ignition source and the design 
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considerations, however, it doesn’t contain the detailed assessment method of the fuel tank ignition source; 
In this paper, a particular method that can be used in the design stage to evaluate the safety of the fuel tank 
ignition source failure is proposed.
2. Definitions And Assumptions
2.1. Definitions
Ignition source is a source of sufficient energy to ignite combustion of a fuel/air mixture. Surfaces that 
can exceed the auto-ignition temperature of the flammable vapour under consideration are considered to 
be ignition sources. Electrical arcs, electrical sparks and friction sparks are also considered ignition 
sources if sufficient energy is released to initiate combustion.
Intrinsically safe is that any instrument, equipment, or wiring that is incapable of releasing sufficient 
electrical or thermal energy under normal operating conditions, anticipated failure conditions, and 
environmental conditions which could cause an ignition source within the fuel tank.
Latent Failure is a failure whose presence may not be readily apparent to the flight crew or 
maintenance personnel. A significant latent failure is one that would, in combination with one or more 
specific failures or events result in a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition.
2.2. Assumptions
The safety assessment for fuel tank system ignition source failure would be conducted based upon the 
following assumptions: 1) the analysis would assume that the environment inside the fuel tank is always 
flammable. The conditions required to ignite fuel vapors from ignition sources vary with pressures and 
temperatures within the fuel tank and can be affected by sloshing or spraying of fuel in the tank˗2) 
Unless design features are incorporated that mitigate the hazards resulting from a fuel tank ignition event 
(e.g. polyurethane foam, adequate structural margin), the safety assessment would assume that the 
presence of an ignition source is a catastrophic failure condition.
3. Fuel Tank System Ignition Source Fail-Safe Analysis
3.1. Possible Ignition Source
This method is intended to analysis system failures that may result in the presence of an ignition 
source in the fuel tanks, and is not intended to analysis failures or conditions that could lead to ignition of 
fuel vapours from such sources as uncontained engine debris post crash fire heating of tank surfaces, etc. 
So the possible ignition sources [1] are as shown in table 1.
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Table 1. Possible ignition sources
Failure Code Area Ignition Sources
A1 Internal to the tank
Electrical fuel pumps;
FQGS(Fuel Quantity Gauging System);
Bonding failure;
Electrostatic charge;
Hydraulics heater exchanger;
A2 External to the tank
Wiring routing and protection;
Landing light;
Bleed and anti-icing system lines;
Electrical actuated/operated components of fuel system; 
Hydraulic system, etc.
A3
Environmental 
ignition sources
Lightning/bonding;
EMI/HIRF;
3.2. Safety Requirements To Ignition Source
Airplane fuel tank systems have a limited number of possible ignition sources. According to some 
related airworthiness regulations, it is required that no ignition source should be presented in the fuel tank 
or fuel tank system where catastrophic failure may occur due to ignition of fuel or vapors .Three failure 
scenarios (shown in Fig 1) that must be addressed in order to show compliance with the rule[2]: (a) Each 
single failure, regardless of the probability of occurrence of the failure, must not cause an ignition source;
(b) All combinations of failures not shown to be extremely improbable must not cause an ignition source;
(c) Each single failure, regardless of the probability of occurrence, in combination with any latent failure 
condition not shown to be at least extremely remote (i.e. not shown to be extremely remote or extremely 
improbable), must not cause an ignition source.
Fig. 1. Failure Modes of Ignition Sources
3.3. Ignition Source Fail-Safe Analysis
To meet the requirements mentioned above, it needs to analyze a single failure with FMEA. An FMEA 
[3] is a systematic, bottom-up method of identifying the failure modes of a system, item, or function and 
determining the effects on the next higher level. It can be performed at any level within the system (e.g., 
piece-part, function, black box, etc.). For analyzing ignition sources fail-safe feature, FMEA may include 
the following information: Identification of component, signal, and/or function; Failure effects (directly 
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and/or at the next higher level); Phase of flight in which the failure occurs; Severity of failure effects, etc.
Table 2 shown below is a kind of FMEA worksheets.
Table 2. FMEA Worksheet
Part No. Part Type Failure Mode Hazard Type Comments
1
2
3
Ă
After FMEA to the single failure to ensure that it will not cause an ignition source, it is necessary to 
analyze some combination of failures causing an ignition source that will not bring a catastrophic accident
to the aircraft with FTA. A Fault Tree Analysis is a “top-down” system evaluation procedure in which a 
qualitative model for a particular undesired event is formed and then evaluated. The analyst begins with 
an undesired top level hazard event and systematically determines all credible single faults and failure
combinations of the system functional blocks at the next lower level which could cause this event. The 
analysis proceeds down through successively more detailed (i.e., lower) levels of the design until a 
Primary Event is uncovered or until the top level hazard event requirement has been satisfied. A typical 
FTA is shown in Fig 2.
Fig. 2. A Typical FTA
The method to calculate the probability of the top event:
a) When different minimum cuts don’t contain the same basic event, the probability of the top event 
can be calculated with formula (1):
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b) When different minimum cuts contain the same basic event, the probability of the top event can be 
calculated with formula (2):
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In formula (2), i is the ordinal number of the basic event; k is the number of the basic event; r , h , k are 
the ordinal number of the minimum cuts; rKi means the first i basic event belongs to the first 
r minimum cut; K is the symbol of the minimum cut; jh KKi  means the first i basic event
ix belongs to the first h minimum cut or the first j minimum cut; kjh dd1 is the range of h and 
j .
The steps of the analysis are as follows:
Step1. Determine the ignition sources of the fuel tank system, including latent ignition source;
Step2. Make it clear the requirements in the design rules, including related event content and 
maximum acceptable probability, etc;
Step3. Analyze the possible ignition sources with FMEA and FTA qualitatively and quantitatively;
Step4. Give out the conclusion about the fuel tank system ignition sources.
The flowchart [6] of the analysis is shown in Fig 3:
Fig. 3. Flowchart of the Analysis
With the method mentioned above and the steps of the analysis, a program, which can be used to 
calculate the probability of the top event, especially at the early designing stage, when the whole FTA of 
the aircraft has not been built completely, is developed. It can help the designers to analysis ignition 
source fail-safe features easily.Fig.4 is the main interface of the program.
Fig.4.Main interface of analysis program
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4. An Example
An analysis is performed on a type of aircraft fuel tank system. With the method and program above, 
first, the parts related to the fuel system that would be an ignition source are listed in the table, and the 
failure mode, failure effects and hazard type .etc. are analyzed, as shown in the table 3 below:
Table 3. FMEA of the fuel tank system parts
Part No. Part Type Failure Mode Hazard Type Comments
P1 Boost pump Electrical arcing Electrical energy rising
Non-resettable thermal fuse imbedded in motor 
to prevent over temperature.
P2 FQGS Harnessprotection 
energy at 
hazardous
levels to enter
fuel tank
Electrical Energy 
Rising and short 
circuit
No other power cables inside fuel tank
P3
Engine feed
shutoff valve
actuator 
Electrical
arcing from
actuator
Short circuit Qualification tested to ensure explosion proof
Ă
Then, the combinations of failures would be analyzed with FTA, and the minimum cuts would be 
calculated. The fuel tank system fault tree that ignition source would cause fire in fuel tank system is 
shown in Fig 5 and Table4.
Fig. 5. Ignition Source FTA
Table 4. FTA code and event definition
Code Event definition Code Event definition
T Fire in Fuel Tank System B2 Fuel Pipe Leak
A1 Fuel Leak B3 Fuel Pipe Leak at Connectors
A2 Ignition Source B4 Degradation of wire insulation
B1 Fuel Tank Leak B5 Arcing Within Electrical Connectors
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With the program and using formula (1) in 3.3, the probability of the minimum cuts that would occur 
is shown in Fig.6.

Fig. 6. Minimum Cuts and Probability of Events
5. Conclusion
The method of aircraft fuel tank system ignition source fail-safe feature analysis with FMEA and FTA
was proposed in this paper. Applying the proposed method, a type of aircraft fuel tank system ignition 
source was analyzed as an example. The results of the application example indicated the proposed 
methods are reasonable and efficient.
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